fragments of consciousness

More PhilPapers survey results

We have just posted a number of new results from last year's PhilPapers Philosophical Survey.  The results include correlations (over the responses from 930 target faculty) between the main answers to the survey, and correlations of those answers with background factors include gender, age, nationality, and much else.  We've also posted an attempt at a factor analysis, and a list of all public respondents.

The correlation results largely speak for themselves.  There are some fairly predictable geographic effects: e.g. a UK affiliation correlates most strongly with disjunctivism and a belief in a priori knowledge; Australasia with consequentialism and B-theory; US with deontology and Millianism; Europe with Fregeanism.  The strongest gender effects are that being female correlates with holding an epistemic view of truth, with not switching on the trolley problem, with rejecting apriority and analyticity, and with scientific anti-realism, while being male correlates with the opposite.  The strongest age effects are correlations of youth with Humeanism, B-theory, teletransporter survival, content externalism, and knowledge invariantism (and with being accurate on the metasurvey!).  There's much else of interest on the "highest correlations page" as well as on the pages for specific variables.

The factor analysis is not especially sophisticated, but the first four or five factors seem reasonably identifiable, corresponding roughly to naturalism, realism (especially about values and abstracta), rationalism, externalism, and epistemically oriented anti-realism.  Of course all this is partly a function of the somewhat arbitrary choice of survey questions.

The list of public respondents (along with browsable responses) is also worth checking out.  A sampling of names that may be familiar to readers of this blog include Berit Brogaard, Laurence Bonjour, Sally Haslanger, Terry Horgan, Brian Leiter, Joe Levine, Beatrice Longuenesse, David Papineau, Derek Parfit, John Perry, Nathan Salmon, Michael Tye, Peter Unger, Stephen Yablo, and me.  One can also see which respondents have given answers that are similar to those of a specific respondent.  I'd encourage others to make their responses public so they can be browsed in this way.

Actuality and Knowability

I've put a new paper online: "Actuality and Knowability".  This is a short paper with an argument from five antecedently plausible premises for the conclusion that there are instances of p iff actually p that are not knowable a priori, and indeed not knowable at all.  (One takes p to be No-one entertains q, where q is a proposition no-one actually entertains.)  This conclusion is surprising, at least to me, as the view that p iff actually p is always knowable a priori is more or less philosophical orthodoxy, and it is a view that I was strongly inclined to hold myself.  It has some other surprising consequences.  For example, it suggests that knowability is not closed under a priori entailment, and that provability does not entail knowability.

In the paper, I offer a diagnosis of the result in terms of the phenomenon I call "semantic fragility", and I explore some options for accepting or avoiding the result.  I also draw some tentative morals.  For now, I'm inclined to think that some possible morals are (i) that a scope analysis of 'actually' has more going for it than one might antecedently have thought, (ii) that the epistemological properties of sentences and of the propositions they express can come apart in surprising ways, and (iii) that a notion of propositional apriority along the lines of There is an a priori justification for p is in some ways runs deeper than the standard It is knowable a priori that p.

The seed for the paper was a remark near the end of my 2006 reply to Soames.  The argument poses obvious problems for Soames's view of 'actually' (discussed briefly in the current paper), but I've come to think that the underlying phenomenon is of broader relevance.   I've been led to think about these matters further by working through issues about sentential and propositional apriority in Chapter 2 of Constructing the World (although I haven't yet incorporated this new material into the chapter) and in note 24 of "Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account".  I suspect that I haven't yet gotten to the bottom of all this, and any thoughts are welcome.

PhilPapers Survey results

Some preliminary results of the PhilPapers Survey and Metasurvey are now available.  There are all sorts of interesting data.  Among issues of interest to readers of this blog in the Survey results, for example: 56% of target faculty responding favor (i.e. accept or lean toward) physicalism, while 27% favor nonphysicalism (for respondents as a whole, the figure is 54:29).  A priori knowledge is favored by 71-18%, an analytic-synthetic distinction is favored by 65-27%, Millianism is favored over Fregeanism by 34-29%, while the view that zombies are conceivable but not metaphysically possible is favored over metaphysical possibility and conceivability respectively by 35-23-16% respectively.

The Metasurvey results are also very interesting.  For quite a few questions, mean estimates differ from the actual figures by around 20%.  For aesthetic value, the mean normalized estimate (setting "other" to zero) favor "subjective" over "objective" by 68:32, but the actual figures favor "objective" by 54:46.  For the analytic-synthetic distinction, estimates are 50:50, while the actual figures are 70:30.  Something  similar applies to laws of nature: estimates favor non-Humeanism by 52:48, actual figures by 70:30.  Nonphysicalism is mildly underestimated (28% compared to 32%) as is rationalism (33% compared to 44%).  Estimates predict consequentialism, invariantism, and nominalism to be the leading views on their questions, but actual results favor deontology, contextualism, and Platonism.  I got plenty wrong myself.

At this point, we have made available basic data the distribution of Survey and Metasurvey answers, broken down by basic population (faculty, graduate student, etc) and by area of specialization.  We will make more data available before long.  We have also released basic demographic data, and we have included some thoughts on the Survey's conception and design and on the results.  We are making survey respondents' own responses available to them, and before long we will allow these to be made public where appropriate.

We encourage you to look closely at these results, to play around with the various breakdowns, and to discuss the results in the PhilPapers Survey discussion forum.

The Philosophical Survey

David Bourget and I have recently launched a new PhilPapers project: the Philosophical Survey.  This is a survey of the philosophical views of members of the philosophy profession and others.  We encourage all professional philosophers, graduate students, and interested others to take part.

The survey contains thirty questions, each giving a choice between 2-4 views on a philosophical issue.  Respondents can indicate that they accept or lean toward one of the options or can give one of a variety of "other" answers.  We have kept the questions as simple as possible, as clarification would be a never-ending process.  The survey also asks for some optional background information.

We have already launched the survey by e-mail to philosophers in 99 leading departments and to users of PhilPapers, and so far we have had responses by around 1000 professional philosophers and 700 others.  We are now opening up the survey publicly so that anyone can take it. The questions focus on issues in analytic philosophy, and will make most sense to those with some experience in the area, but anyone is welcome to take it.  We will publish results for the population of professional philosophers, graduate students, and other groups.

You can take the survey here.  Note that to take the survey, you must either have a PhilPapers account or  create a guest survey account, which will require a valid email address.  If you have received a direct email invitation to take the survey, please use the unique link found in that email instead.  These measures allow us to minimize survey abuse and to maximize the reliability of responses.  For further information about privacy concerns and about the methodology of the survey, see the survey's information page.

The extended will

Joel Anderson gave a nice talk in CAPPE a few days ago on "Scaffolded Autonomy and the Extended Will".  The talk focuses on the role of environmental triggers in facilitating the control of action, and on the ensuing possibility of an extended view of the will.  The paper isn't online, but see his "Procrastination and the Extended Will" (co-authored with Joseph Heath) for the general idea.

Joel wasn't certain whether he wanted a real extended will thesis, or a weaker embedding thesis on which the environment plays a crucial explanatory role in the processes that support and sustain an (internally constituted) will.  I think the key issue in choosing between them is whether one can get an Otto/Inga case going for the extended will, and especially whether one can get a twin case going, as one needs for a strong extension thesis.  Something like the following three cases are my best stab at it:

(1) Ida is working on her book, which is important to her.  She regularly is distracted with thoughts of watching TV.  Every time the thought occurs she quashes it, and realizes that she should return to work.  So she returns to work.

(2) Ollie is working on his book, which is important to him.  He regularly is distracted with thoughts on watching TV.  Every time thought occurs, he looks toward the TV, sees a sign saying "Return to work!", and realizes that he should return to work.  So he returns to work.

Fodor on the extended mind

Jerry Fodor has a lively and thoughtful review of Andy Clark's new book Supersizing the Mind in the latest issue of the London Review of Books.  The paper is in effect a critique of the extended mind thesis, targeting Andy's and my joint paper "The Extended Mind", Andy's book, and my foreword to the book.  Fodor makes two or three interesting objections to the extended mind thesis.

Fodor's first objection is that we haven't given any clear content to the claim that extended objects (such as iPhones and notepads) can be parts of the mind.  Here it's worth noting that we never put things in exactly this way in the original paper: at a couple of points we talk of external objects being parts of cognitive processes, but not parts of minds.  I do talk about parts of the mind in the foreword, but this is mainly to quickly give a sense of the thesis for general readers. In any case, I think that talk about "parts" here (and of "minds", for that matter) is quite dispensable.

A taxonomy of philosophy

Now back to philosophy.  Or at least, to philosophical taxonomy. David Bourget and I are finalizing a new project for access to online work in philosophy.  To a very rough first approximation it will be like MindPapers generalized to all of philosophy, although there will be many significant differences (it will be less ambitious in some respects, more ambitious in others).  More on that when it goes public, hopefully within the next month or so.

One part of the project is a classification scheme, under which any paper in philosophy can be classified in up to three areas.  The idea is that at least eventually, the classification scheme should be about as fine-grained as the MindPapers scheme.  Philosophy is divided up into five clusters (Metaphysics and Epistemology, Value Theory, Science Logic and Mathematics, History of Western Philosophy, Other Philosophical Traditions).  Each cluster is divided into six or more fields (in M&E, for example, these are Epistemology, Metaphilosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Religion).  Each field is divided into 5-10 areas (in Philosophy of Mind, for example, these are Consciousness, Intentionality, Perception, Metaphysics of Mind, Epistemology of Mind, Mental States and Processes, and Misc).  Then each area can be divided into up to ten topics, and up to ten subtopics of each in turn (in roughly the way that the main areas of philosophy of mind are divided into topics and subtopics in Mindpapers).

With help from a number of others, including consultants in a wide range of areas, we've made a very rough first attempt at a taxonomy.  Unsurprisingly, this taxonomy is better-developed in some areas than others.  And even in areas where it is reasonably well-developed, many tricky decisions have to be made.  Eventually, we will have ongoing projects for the refinement and development of these categories, with systematic consultation.  For now, however, we're trying to get things up to scratch for a first draft.

At the moment, the various areas of M&E (apart from philosophy of religion) are developed to a fair degree of detail, though there is still work to be done.  Value Theory and Science/Logic/Mathematics are more patchy.  Some fields in these clusters (such as Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality, Philosophy of Education, and Philosophy of Social Sciences) are hardly subdivided at all, while other areas (such as General Philosophy of Science, Social and Political Philosophy, and many other areas in these clusters) are extremely patchy and incomplete.  As for History of Philosophy, we've decided not to subdivide this for now beyond a few obvious groupings, and then categories for a few individuals in each period (these were settled by mechanically choosing those with more than n entries with their name in the title in the database, followed by a small amount of tweaking), although we may well subdivide these further eventually.  And we haven't made any attempt to subdivide the Other Philosophical Traditions.

For now, I'm calling for feedback from the philosophical community, either via e-mail or via comments on this blog.  Especially valuable will be thoughts on categories that we've missed, on ways to structure categories that don't yet have much structure, and on better ways of structuring things in tricky cases.  The field structure is largely set (though perhaps not irrevocably), but the area structure is still a work in progress in many cases, and topics and subtopics are still very much in progress.  In many cases what we have has been compiled partly from our own sense of the fields, partly from Internet sources (the Stanford Encyclopedia has been valuable), and partly from feedback from others, but all three of these things have been more extensive and useful in some fields than in others.  So further feedback will be very useful at this stage.  For now, our aim is to fill in structure in the first three main clusters, though thoughts about the other two clusters are also welcome.  Of course we probably won't be able to follow every suggestion, but we'll at least give every reasonable suggestion some consideration.

Some methodology: we'd like to stick to 5-10 subcategories per category where possible, as this makes the system much more usable (and there are also relevant technological constraints).  Of course sometimes there will be fewer (especially at the topic/subtopic level), and some topics may not have subtopics at all, especially in smaller areas.  In a few cases it seems unavoidable to have more subcategories, but this shouldn't happen too often.  Typically, finest-grained categories will have around 15-100 papers in them.  More than this calls for further division, while less than this calls for less division.  For now, we don't want to go beyond five levels.  A given category can be crosslisted under multiple parent categories, marked withn asterisk in the taxonomy.  Each crosslisted category has a primary parent category under which it is listed without an asterisk, though in some cases this selection is fairly arbitrary.  For many purposes the choice of primary parent category won't matter much, as the relevant papers can show up in multiple places.

Of course there are many ways to produce a taxonomy like this, and this is just one way.  For a start, the system is produced by analytic philosophers and has a bias toward carving things as an analytic philosopher would.  Still, we'd like the system to be useful to continental philosophers and those in other traditions.  Continental philosophy is covered to a considerable extent under 19th and 20th century philosophy, and there's a separate field under "Other Philosophical Traditions" both to capture contemporary work that doesn't fit well elsewhere, and to provide a way to mark continental papers for those who are looking for them.  There's no reason why papers from continental and other traditions can't be included under the first three clusters too, though, and we're open to using categories that will help make that possible.  Even from within an analytic perspective, of course many taxonomies are possible, but as always some choices need to be made.  We're not suggesting that this is a definitive taxonomy (it's just something to make a website more useful), and we'd look forward to seeing other taxonomic attempts by others.  And again, keep in mind that what we have currently is extremely preliminary and is highly sketchy and inexpert in some fields.

With that in mind, all constructive feedback by e-mail or in the comments is welcome.  Feedback from those with expertise in relevant areas is especially welcome, and non-anonymous comments are especially appreciated.  Again, here's the draft taxonomy.  Thanks in advance,

J.T. Leroy and the causal theory of reference

The J.T. Leroy case raises some interesting philosophical issues. For those who haven't been paying attention: three novels have been published under the name of J.T. Leroy, and many people take themselves to have had phone conversations with Leroy and to have met and talked with him in person.  Leroy is put forward as a reclusive 25-year-old transgendered former child prostitute and drug addict.  It now seems plausible that novels attributed to J.T. Leroy were written by Laura Albert, a 39-year-old musician who the official Leroy narrative holds to have rescued Leroy from the streets since 1993, and to have lived with him and her husband Geoffrey Knoop since then.  It also seems plausible that most phone conversations apparently with Leroy were with Laura Albert.  However, the person identified as J.T. Leroy in public appearances and in face-to-face conversation appears to be Savannah Knoop, Geoffrey Knoop's half-sister.

(For background, see the New York article "Who is the Real JT LeRoy? A search for the true identity of a great literary hustler", and the more recent New York Times article "The Unmasking of J.T. Leroy", as well as the Wikipedia link above. Or for another perspective, see the official J.T. Leroy website and blog.)

Let us assume for the sake of discussion that the facts are roughly as suggested by these articles.  Then we can still ask the question: Who is J.T. Leroy?  Four answers seem to be possible:

(1) J.T. Leroy is Laura Albert
(2) J.T. Leroy is Savannah Knoop
(3) J.T. Leroy does not exist
(4) It is indeterminate who J.T. Leroy is

Set aside (4) for now, and try to choose between the first three if you can.  (Stop here to form your own judgment before reading on.)  (2) seems to me to be clearly the least plausible, so that the leading contenders are (1) and (3).  I can see someone making a case for (1). But my own intuition is that the best thing to say is (3): if the facts are as described, then J.T. Leroy does not exist.  I'm interested to hear others' judgments, though.

The naturalness of this judgment gets some support from other famous literary hoaxes, such as the Ern Malley case in Australia in the 1940's.  Here, the poems attributed to Ern Malley (who like J.T. Leroy was put forward as having a specific life story) were in fact written by James McCauley and Harold Stewart, in an attempt to debunk modernist poetry.  Since the facts were revealed, the standard description of the case usually involves the claim that Ern Malley did not exist.  Even the official Ern Malley website characterizes him as "the poet who never lived".  And as distinguished a source as David Lewis tells us that "Ern Malley was a nonexistent object".

If (3) is correct, and J.T. Leroy does not exist, then 'J.T. Leroy' does not refer.  Likewise for 'Ern Malley'.  This has consequences for the causal theory of reference.  The dominant causal source for 'J.T. Leroy' is clearly Laura Albert, I think.  Savannah Knoop complicates things, but it appears that she only entered the picture late in the day, around 2001.  So one might think that if a simple causal theory of reference were correct, the name would refer to Laura Albert, and we could correctly say that Leroy is Albert.  The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for Ern Malley.  (Again, this case is complicted by the two authors, but it seems likely that people would still say that Ern Malley did not exist even if there were just one author.)  So our intuitive judgments here tend to cast doubt on a simple causal theory of reference.

Of course there are more subtle versions of the causal theory of reference, which allow speaker's intentions to play a central role, although such theories have not been developed in much detail.  But at the least, cases like this can help show the form that such a theory would have to take.  The obvous suggestion here is that there are also descriptive as well as causal constraints on reference: for example, it might be required that for someone to qualify as the referent of 'J.T. Leroy', they have to fit Leroy's purported life-story well enough, and no-one does.  Of course this is tricky: no-one says that James Frey did not exist, because his purported life-story was greatly exaggerated.  And even with the largely fabricated life-story of Helen Demidenko, people are inclined to say that Helen Demidenko is Helen Darville.  If the Leroy case were more like these cases, then presumably we would say that J.T. Leroy exists and wrote the novels, but that Leroy did not do most of the things that he/she claims to have done.

Here it is interesting to examine what sort of modifications to the Leroy case lead to a difference here, and to see what are the relevant differences between the Leroy and Malley cases on the one hand, and the Demidenko and Frey cases on the other.  The name of the actual author seems to matter: If one modifies the Leroy case so that Albert's name had in fact been 'J.T. Leroy' all along, while leaving other facts the same, then I think my judgment would incline toward the view that Leroy exists.  But the Demidenko case suggests that this is not all that is going on.  Some similarity in actual and purported characteristics seem to matter: both Demidenko and Frey at least share an age and a gender with the characters they describe.  In the Leroy case, if one modifies the case so that the Albert figure is a 25-year old male, I think I would incline much more in the direction of (1).  So there seems to be a strong sensitivity of our judgments to certain descriptive information, but it is far from obvious what the relevant information is, or why it should be relevant.  I'd say that this is a good case for experimental philosophers!

Of course one might just throw up one's hands and say (4), or perhaps decline to answer altogether.  There is certainly some appeal to the suggestion that the whole issue as to who counts as "J.T. Leroy" is terminological.  On the other hand, it is possible that the issue matters at least for some legal issues.  For example, if Leroy's name appears in contracts, then the issue could matter a great deal -- though I suspect that Albert has designed any contracts very carefully! And, like other terminological issues, the question at least has consequences for the philosophy of terminology -- here, in its embodiment as the theory of reference.  So it would be nice to get clearer on just what's going on here.

Post-docs at ANU

The following ad will appear in the November 10 issue of Jobs for Philosophers:

The Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, seeks to appoint one or more research-only Postdoctoral/Research Fellows (Level A/B).  The fellows will be appointed in association with Professor David Chalmers' Federation Fellowship project on 'The Contents of Consciousness', and/or in association with other projects in the Program in related areas.  Candidates should hold a Ph.D. in philosophy or a related discipline prior to appointment, and should specialize in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and/or epistemology.  Appointment will be for up to three years.  The Program will consider proposals to fill the positions by secondment, and particularly welcomes applications from women. Send applications (reference: SS3074) to: The Staffing Recruitment Officer, Chancelry 10A, Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia, or by e-mail (Word, rtf, or pdf format) to [email protected]  Full details are available at http://consc.net/fellows.html.  Closing date: 1 December, 2005.

The official ANU website has full formal details.  As with last year, I've posted online a few informal comments for potential applicants for the position.  Particularly worth noting among the informal comments is that it is possible that applicants for this position may also be considered for two other post-doctoral fellowships in the RSSS philosophy program, one in the philosophy of mind and one in epistemology.  (Funding for these fellowships was just announced this week, too late to put an ad into JFP.)  So that's all the more reason to apply.

Australasian philosophy family tree

In an earlier post, I mentioned Josh Dever's philosophy family tree project.  To help out with this project, I've now compiled an Australasian philosophy family tree.  Thanks to many Australian and New Zealand philosophers for their help with this.  Of course it is still incomplete, but I think it is probably well over halfway by now.  It's very interesting to see the various lineages, even though they are highly imperfect mirrors of influence.  If you have any additions or corrections, please let me know here or by e-mail.

Philosophy family tree

Josh Dever at Texas is putting together a philosophy family tree, consisting of (mostly) philosophers related by the Ph.D. advisor relation.  By now it has excellent coverage of some corners of the philosophical world, but there are also some big missing areas (e.g. most of Australian and British philosophy) and some key bits of missing information in the corners that are present.  Josh has started a blog to gather missing information, and welcomes information either on the blog or by e-mail.  It would be good if people could collectively supply as much information as possible.  E.g., if you have a Ph.D. in philosophy and this information isn't already there, let Josh know the identity of your advisor, your advisor's advisor, and so on, as well as any advisees, siblings (advisees of your advisor), and so on.

For my part, my main advisor (at Indiana) was Doug Hofstadter, whose advisor was a physicist at Oregon, so I don't go far back on that line.  But officially my co-advisor was Mike Dunn, whose advisor (at Pittsburgh) was Nuel Belnap, whose advisor (at Yale) was Frederic Fitch, whose advisor (at Yale) is not currently known (update: Fitch now goes back via F.C.S. Northrop and W.E. Hocking to Josiah Royce, and from there via a few intermediate steps to Kant and Leibniz!)  so that's at least a partial hook-up into the body of the tree.

Terminological disputes: Request for examples

For the paper I'm writing on terminological disputes, I would like as many examples of terminological disputes as possible.  There are a lot of potential examples within philosophy, but it would be good to have some from outside philosophy, too.  In particular, it might be nice to start with an example from literature.   If anyone can think of good examples from a work of fiction -- say, two characters having an argument that starts out looking like a substantive disagreement but which turns out to be an argument over a word -- please let me know.  Examples from politics, science, everyday life wouldn't hurt, either.  For that matter, I wouldn't mind gathering a lot of philosophical examples.  So you're hereby requested to post suggestions in the comments or by e-mail.

I'll be giving this paper (abstract here) at the Australasian Association of Philosophy (Sydney, July 3-8), for which the really excellent program is now online.

Advertisement: PhD at ANU

It's well-known that the philosophy program at the Australian National University is one of the best in the world.  (See e.g. the Gourmet Report, where ANU is ranked something like seventh internationally.)  But as I've discovered since moving here, ANU doesn't receive remotely as many applications for its Ph.D. program as a comparable program in the US.  Obviously many international students don't think about applying to ANU, partly because of distance and because of a different application schedule. But at the same time, this means that it presents students with a great opportunity to get into a strong program.  This entry is part of an attempt to raise the visibility of the program as a destination for prospective Ph.D. students.  (If you don't like advertising, feel free to stop reading now!)

First, the joys of the program.  A look at the Gourmet specialty rankings will show that ANU is especially strong (i.e. in a tie for first or second internationally) in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of cognitive science, the philosophy of biology, and applied ethics.  It is also very strong in metaphysics, meta-ethics, and political philosophy (top ten) and the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science, and decision theory (top fifteen).  In addition, I think it's fair to say that for the philosophy of consciousness specifically, there is an unmatched group of people working in the area.

Philosophy in the 1960s

An interesting conversation at the Pacific APA: name great works in analytic philosophy published in the 1960s.  One can find important papers and books if one tries.  But it's not as easy as you'd think, and even in many of these cases, it's not the most important work by the philosopher in question.  The contrast with the 1950s and the 1970s, where truly major works just roll off the tongue, is pretty striking.  Of course there's no doubt that a lot of important work was going on in the 1960s, and the many major books and articles of the early 1970s were presumably the result of hard thinking in the preceding years.  But going by publication dates, there's nevertheless the appearance of a mild down period.  Why the drop-off just then?  (In a period of fruition for so many other areas, too.)  Perhaps it was some sort of intergenerational period of consolidation.  It's surprising, all the same.

Still, one might take the phenomenon as hopeful.  Lots of people have discerned a similar drop-off in truly important philosophical work in the 1980s, or the 1990s, or choose your decade.  Of course perspective makes this hard to assess, and there's unquestionably been a lot of very good work in these decades. But it's a common enough judgment, one that makes some people worry about the future of the field.  Nevertheless: if we take the 1960s as a model, one might hope that any contemporary drop-off is just another eye in the (multiple-eyed?) storm.

Anyway, suggested explanations of the phenomenon, and/or defenses of the 1960s, are welcome.

Philosophers' Annual

It's time for nominations for the 2004 edition of the Philosophers' Annual, which attempts to select the "ten best" articles published in a given year.  The way this works is that each member of a 43-person editorial board submits up to three nominations, and then the four editors choose ten articles from this group.  Results are online for 1978-2001, 2002, and 2003.

I'm on the editorial board, and I'd welcome suggestions for nominations.  It would be good to cast as wide a net as possible.  It's sometimes said that selections for the Annual reflect connectedness in the profession, and that the same authors are selected repeatedly.  So I'm especially interested to hear about articles and authors that might otherwise be overlooked.  But suggestions of all sorts (except self-nominations), in all areas, are welcome.  I can't promise to read everything that's suggested, but maybe other members of the editorial board will be reading this too, and in any case it's interesting to hear about good work.

(I notice that two of the papers mentioned in a corresponding thread last year on Brian Weatherson's site made it onto the 2003 list.  See also the discussion of 2004 epistemology papers at Certain Doubts.)