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August 03, 2005



one problem with focusing on the uncontested core cases, such as sensory experience, is that on some views of phenomenology, there is no phenomenology whatsoever - not even sensory phenomenology - in the absence of one of the contested kinds of phenomenology.

For instance, for Alva Noe (if I understand him correctly), in the absence of expectancy phenomenology there is no phenomenology at all; but the very existence of the expectacy phenomenology is controversial. Likewise, on my view, in the absence of a phenomenology of for-me-ness there is no phenomenology at all; but the very existence of a for-me-ness phenomenology is controversial.

One issue is whether these extra claims are themselves phenomenological. After all, we are making two claims. First, we say 'there is a phenomenology of X', where that is controversial. But then we add the arguably even more controversial 'the phenomenology of X is a precondition for any phenomenology'. It's a question whether this second claim is best thought off as a phenomenological claim.

Pierre de Fermata

I have discovered a truly marvelous joke connecting consciousness studies, the US-Iraq war, topological string theory, and UN Security Council reform, but the narrow content is too marginal to fit in this blog.

Eray Ozkural

It is likely that CIA is more keen on deploying zombie battledrone armies and fully conscious human clone armies. But this is beyond the scope of philosophy of mind really, it's not possible for us to explain every way in which imperialism is unethical.

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