Leopold Stubenberg's marvelous SEP entry on neutral monism is now online.
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February 08, 2005
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That is a nice essay and very informative. I'm not sure I see the validity of placing panpsychism and neutral monism in opposition to one another, though.
I have a natural functionalist inclination about the essence of the mental. For instance, I believe that features such as memory, emotion, awareness of time, hope, belief and reason, require certain kinds of form and function. From there, it is a short step to concluding that there can be no mentality with out at least some features like those.
If one is a fundamentalist about experiencing as a panexperientalist would be, a view of experiencings as inherently neutral follows from there without too much difficulty. So why should something like a panexperientialist neutral monism be viewed as an oxymoron? Or have I misread Stubenberg?
Posted by: Gregg Rosenberg | February 09, 2005 at 08:42 AM