Joel Anderson gave a nice talk in CAPPE a few days ago on "Scaffolded Autonomy and the Extended Will". The talk focuses on the role of environmental triggers in facilitating the control of action, and on the ensuing possibility of an extended view of the will. The paper isn't online, but see his "Procrastination and the Extended Will" (co-authored with Joseph Heath) for the general idea.
Joel wasn't certain whether he wanted a real extended will thesis, or a weaker embedding thesis on which the environment plays a crucial explanatory role in the processes that support and sustain an (internally constituted) will. I think the key issue in choosing between them is whether one can get an Otto/Inga case going for the extended will, and especially whether one can get a twin case going, as one needs for a strong extension thesis. Something like the following three cases are my best stab at it:
(1) Ida is working on her book, which is important to her. She regularly is distracted with thoughts of watching TV. Every time the thought occurs she quashes it, and realizes that she should return to work. So she returns to work.
(2) Ollie is working on his book, which is important to him. He regularly is distracted with thoughts on watching TV. Every time thought occurs, he looks toward the TV, sees a sign saying "Return to work!", and realizes that he should return to work. So he returns to work.