For the last couple of years I have mostly been working on books, so I have not posted many papers here. But I've recently significantly revised three old drafts and written up two new ones (previously circulated as talks), as follows:
- Verbal Disputes and Philosophical Progress: This is a written-up version of the old Powerpoint on Terminological Disputes (I gave in and went with the more common "verbal dispute"). Still extremely drafty in places.
- Revisability and Conceptual Change: A written-up version of an earlier handout on Conceptual Analysis meets "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". It's a critique of Quine's argument from revisability in "Two Dogmas", using a Bayesian version of a Carnapian criterion for conceptual change.
- Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence. A heavily revised version of "Probability and Propositions". It argues against referentialist views of the objects of credence and develops a nonreferential view. It now includes some new material on updating beliefs with centered-world contents and on chance-credence principles.
- The Nature of Epistemic Space. A revised version of a paper that has been kicking around since 2001, now forthcoming in the Epistemic Modality volume edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson. It contains a long new section on Kaplan's paradox concerning the cardinality of the space of possible worlds.
- Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. A revised version of my paper spelling out a detailed two-dimensional account of attitude ascriptions. As a bonus includes material on the Fregean hierarchy and communication, as well as a treatment of many puzzle cases and some replies to Scott Soames' arguments against 2D accounts of attitude ascriptions. Forthcoming in Nous.