Another new online paper: "Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account". This lays out the two-dimensional account of Fregean senses and propositions that I now favor (this is a change from the view in "On Sense and Intension"), and uses this to give an account of propositional attitude ascription (one that is mostly compatible with the remarks on this subject in "The Components of Content" but which goes beyond this and is much more detailed). Along the way I address a number of standard puzzles about attitude ascriptions. In my favorite part of the paper, the Fregean hierarchy of senses is reconstructed in 2-D terms. In the last section of the paper, I respond to Scott Soames' objections (in his book Reference and Description) to my earlier account of attitude ascriptions.
The paper is still a draft and comments are very welcome. The typesetting is still a work in progress. I've just returned to using LaTeX after many years away and I'm sure there are plenty of errors.