I just received my copy of Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowlege: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, edited by Torin Alter and Sven Walter. There have been quite a few collections of new papers on consciousness in recent years, but I think this is the best of them. It's focused on what has become the central set of issues in the debate over materialism and dualism about consciousness: namely, the epistemic and ontological gaps between the physical and the phenomenal, and the role that phenomenal concepts play in grounding these gaps. I'd say that every paper in this book is important, and that collectively the papers in the book greatly advance our understanding of these topics.
The first section on the knowledge argument has a number of special treats: Knut Nordby, the achromat color scientist, with a piece on what it's like to be in Mary's situation; Lawrence Nemirow, author of the original defence of the ability hypothesis concerning the knowledge argument, rebutting all the objections to the hypothesis that have sprung up in recent years; Dan Dennett with his "RoboMary" response to the knowledge argument; and an exchange between Frank Jackson and Torin Alter on whether representationalism undermines the knowledge argument (Jackson says yes, Alter no).
The second half of the book has a number of papers right at the leading edge of the debate over phenomenal concepts. Janet Levin and David Papineau set out definitive versions of their well-known materialist views of phenomenal concepts, including replies to objections. Joe Levine and I have papers raising problems for any materialist account of phenomenal concepts. John Hawthorne raises problems for the sort of "direct reference" account of phenomenal concepts that I and many others favor. Finally, there is a terrific set of three papers on arguments for dualism and the role of phenomenal concepts therein. Stephen White defends the property dualism argument and Ned Block argues against it, both with a lot of attention to the conceptual foundations. And Martine Nida-Rümelin has a new and important argument for dualism, one that is based on a two-dimensional analysis but is quite different from the 2-D arguments that I and others have put forward.
The editors are to be congratulated for putting together such a superb book. I expect that the papers in it will shape much of the debate on these topics in the coming years, and I strongly recommend that anyone interested in these issues take a look at it.