A recent issue of Minds and Machines is devoted to the philosophy of Daniel Dennett. It includes an interview with Dennett (subscription required), which is by and large pretty interesting, but which includes along the way the following remarkable passage:
David Chalmers and I have discussed this for what seems an indeterminable number of years, and he candidly grants that he has no arguments in favor of qualia that I haven't rebutted to his satisfaction, he just can't let go of the belief in them.
Needless to say, I've never granted any such thing. I don't think that Dennett's responses are at all satisfactory -- see section 2 of "Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness" for details. Of course it may be neither of us has arguments that the other hasn't rebutted to his own satisfaction -- that's very common in philosophy, and is a very different claim. I suspect that Dan has started from the memory of something I've said to that effect (for my view on the dialectical situation here, see especially the middle of section 2.2 in the paper cited above), and that the memory has gradually evolved in a satisfying way. A nice demonstration of the power of topdown memory biases!
In any case, I'm pleased to report that in private e-mail, Dan not only retracted the attribution, but candidly acknowledged that he now thinks that the arguments for his view are all unsound, and that he now privately favors Cartesian dualism.
(OK, not really.)