fragments of consciousness

Upcoming conferences

Things have been quiet here due to various writing projects.  But conference season is coming up, so I'll post a list of some upcoming events.  Mostly these are events I'm involved with, along with a few others that I've been asked to post about.

• Probability (ANU, March 2-4)
• Pacific APA (Portland, March 22-26)
• Intermountain West Student Conference (Salt Lake City, March 30 - April 1)
• Toward a Science of Consciousness (Tucson, April 4-8)
• Central APA (Chicago, April 26-29)
• Online Philosophy Conference (April)
• Society for Philosophy and Psychology (St.Louis, June 1-4)
• Epistemic Modality (ANU, June 21-23)
• Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (Oxford, June 23-26)
• Australasian Association of Philosophy (ANU, July 2-7)
• Time and Consciousness (Sydney, July 22-24)
• Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference (Bellingham, July 30 - August 3)
• Summer School in Philosophy (Cologne, September 4-8)
• German Analytic Philosophy (Berlin, September 11-14)
• Brains, Persons, and Society (Milan, September 26-30)

I'll probably be at all of these but SPP, ASSC, and Bellingham.  The epistemic modality and time/consciousness conferences are both sponsored by the ANU Centre for Consciousness (the latter jointly with the Sydney Centre for Time) and will have their own websites shortly.  I call people's attention particularly to the AAP here in Canberra in July.  It should be a very enjoyable event, as always.  Also, the Cologne Summer School is mostly devoted to the sort of topics that get discussed on this weblog, so people interested in those topics might take note.

Scott Soames' Two-Dimensionalism

At the meeting of the Central Division of the APA in Chicago this April, there will be an author-meets-critics session on Scott Soames' book Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism, with Bob Stalnaker and me as critics and Soames replying.  I've put online my paper for that session: "Scott Soames' Two-Dimensionalism" (the official version for the session is a somewhat abridged version of this).  As the title suggests, one focus of the paper is the portion of the book where Soames turns out, surprisingly enough, to be a sort of two-dimensionalist himself.  There are also some bits responding to Soames' arguments on issues related to descriptivism and context-dependence.  There's not much overlap with my posts from last year on attitude ascriptions, as all that got much too long.  Instead that material has been incorporated into a new paper on a Fregean account of propositions and attitude ascriptions, which I'll be posting here shortly.