David Papineau has put online his paper "Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts", forthcoming next year in the Alter/Walter collection Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. In the paper he extends and elaborates the "quotational concepts" view he put forward in his 2002 book Thinking about Consciousness, and uses it to answer various anti-materialist challenges. In the last section of the paper, he tries to use the account to answer the challenge I put forward in "Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap", posted here earlier this year, and forthcoming in the same volume.
In that paper, I argued that accounts of phenomenal concepts that attempt to explain away the explanatory gap face a dilemma: either there is an epistemic gap between P (physical processes) and C (the relevant features of phenomenal concepts), or there's not. If the former, then the relevant features of phenomenal concepts can't be physically explained. If the latter, then there's an epistemic gap between C and E (the epistemic feature we face with regard to consciousness), so that C can't be used to explain our epistemic situation. In his paper, Papineau claims to embrace both horns (!) of the dilemma. A response (adapted from recent correspondence with Papineau) is after the fold.