I published the anthology Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings with Oxford University Press in 2002. In preparing that anthology, it proved impossible to do justice to the philosophy of cognitive science, which has become a huge field in its own right. So that volume concentrated on relatively traditional philosophy of mind, and in the introduction I promised an eventual companion anthology on the philosophy of cognitive science. Those promises catch up with one, and the press thinks it's time for the new anthology. So Tim Bayne and I have put together a proposal.
The proposed table of contents is below. Note that this list is extremely tentative: it hasn't yet been through the review process for the press, and we haven't yet sought permission to reprint any of the articles. So the final product may look significantly different. We have aimed for good coverage of many different areas of the philosophy of cognitive science, including both traditional areas of the field and recently active areas. We've also aimed for a fairly even mix of articles by philosophers and articles by scientists on foundational topics. Note that one constraint was that the anthology shouldn't overlap with the other anthology, so it doesn't include any of those articles (contents here) and more generally doesn't aim for extensive coverage of traditional philosophy of mind. Another constraint is that the anthology probably can't be any longer than this (11 sections with 6 articles per section).
At this point we are looking for feedback on the proposal. It would be especially useful to get feedback from people who teach courses in the philosophy of cognitive science (or related topics such as the philosophy of psychology/AI/neuroscience) about what would be desirable for a collection to be used in those courses. But all thoughts are welcome, including suggestions about other papers that might be included, about the balance of coverage, and so on. Feel free to comment either here or by e-mail.
Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Classical and Contemporary Readings
David Chalmers and Tim Bayne, editors.
Proposed Table of Contents.
1. Descartes, R. 1664. Treatise on Man. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (eds.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Vol. 1). CUP.
2. Hume, D. 1739/1740. A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 1. OUP.
3. James, W. 1890. The stream of thought. From Principles of Psychology.
4. Watson, J.B. 1913. Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20: 158-177.
5. Skinner, B.F. 1953. Selections from Science and Human Behavior. Macmillan Free Press.
6. Chomsky, N. 1959. A Review of BF Skinner's Verbal Behavior. Language, 35, No. 1: 26-58.
1. Cummins, R. 2000. "How does it work?" vs. "What are the laws?" Two conceptions of psychological explanation. In F. Keil and R. Wilson (eds), Explanation and Cognition, MIT Press, pp. 117-145.
2. Pylyshyn, Z.W. 1987. What's in a mind? Synthese 70:97-122.
3. Marr, D. 1982. Levels of explanation,. From Vision (Chapter 1, The philosophy and the approach). New York: W.H. Freeman and Co., pp. 19-28.
4. Lycan, W. 1987. Homuncular functionalism. From Consciousness (Chapter 4, The continuity of levels of nature). In Consciousness. MIT Press.
5. Haugeland, J. 1991. Representational genera. In W. Ramsey, S.P. Stich, & D.E. Rumelhart (eds) Philosophy and Connectionist Theory (pp. 61-89).
6. Something on reduction.
C. Artificial Intelligence and Computation
1. Turing, A.M. 1950. Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind 59:433-60.
2. Newell, A. and Simon, H. 1976. Computer Science as empirical inquiry: Symbols and Search. Communications of the ACM 19:113-26
3. Searle, J.R. 1981. Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417-57.
4. Block, N. 1990. The computer model of the mind, In D. Osherson and E. Smith (Eds) Thinking: An Invitation to Cognitive Science. Vol. 3. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5. Hofstadter, D.R. 1985. Waking up from the Boolean dream. From Metamagical Themas. New York: Basic Books.
6. Dennett, D. 1984. Cognitive wheels: the frame problem of AI. In C. Hookway (ed) Minds, Machines and Evolution, CUP: 129-51.
D. Cognitive architecture
1. Churchland, P. and Sejnowski, T. 1989. Neural representation and neural computation. In L. Nadel, L. Cooper, P. Culicover and R.M. Harnish (eds) Neural Connections, Mental Computations, MIT Press (section three onward ).
2. Fodor, J.A. 1987. Why there still has to be a language of thought. Psychosemantics. Cambridge: MA: MIT.
3. van Gelder, T. 1995. What might cognition be, if not computation? Journal of Philosophy, 91: 345-81.
4. Brooks, Rodney A. 1991. Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence, 47(1-3): 139-159.
5. Clark, A. 1997. The dynamical challenge. Cognitive Science 21: 461-81.
6. Fodor, J.A. 1990. Precis of The Modularity of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8: 1-5.
1. Lashley, K. 1950. In search of the engram. Soc. Exp. Biol., 1950, 4: 454-482.
2. Bechtel, W. & Mundale, J. 1999. Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states. Philosophy of Science 66: 175-207.
3. Stoljar, D. and Gold, I. 1998. On Biological and Cognitive Neuroscience, Mind and Language, 13/1: 110-131.
4. Henson, R. in press. What can neuroimaging tell the experimental psychologist? Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.
5. Coltheart, M. 2001. Assumptions and methods in Cognitive Neuropsychology. In B. Rapp (Ed.). Handbook of Cognitive Neuropsychology. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
6. Bickle, J. in press. Reducing mind to molecular pathways. Synthese.
F. Theory of mind
1. Gordon, R.M. 1986. Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and Language 1: 158-71.
2. Stich, S.P. & Nichols, S. 1996. Mental simulation versus tacit theory. In S. Stich Deconstructing the Mind, Oxford: OUP, 136-67.
3. Gopnik, A. & Wellman, H. 1992. Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory. Mind and Language, 7:145-171.
4. Gallese, V. & Goldman, A. 1998. Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mindreading, Trends in the Cognitive Sciences, 12/2: 493-502.
5. Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. 1977. Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84: 231-259.
6. Povinelli, D.J. & Vonk, J. 2003. Chimpanzee minds: Suspiciously human? Trends in the Cognitive Sciences, 7, 157-160.
1. Chalmers, D. 2004. How can we construct a science of consciousness? In M. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences III. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
2. Dennett, Daniel C. 1991. Multiple drafts versus the Cartesian Theatre. In Consciousness Explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co.
3. Churchland, P.S. 1994. What can neurobiology tell us about consciousness? In Proceedings and Addresses of the APA.
4. Crick, F. & Koch, C. 1998. Consciousness and neuroscience. Cerebral Cortex 8: 97-107.
5. Block, N. 1998. How not to find the neural correlate of consciousness. In A. O'Hear (ed.) Royal Institute of Philosophy, Supplement: 43, pp. 23-34.
6. Palmer, S. 1999. Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22 (6): 1-21.
1. Wittgenstein. L. 1953. Selections from Philosophical Investigations (sections 65-76)
2.Rosch, E. 1978. Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. Lloyd (eds) Cognition and Categorization. Lawrence Erlbaum.
3. Armstrong, S.L., Gleitman, L.R., and Gleitman, H. 1983. What some concepts might not be. Cognition, 13: 263-308.
4. Millikan, R. 1998. A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More mama, more milk, and more mouse. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(1): 55-65.
5. Peacocke, C. 1996. Precis of A Study of Concepts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56: 407-11.
6. Fodor, J. 1994. Concepts: A potboiler. Cognition, 50: 95-113.
1. Gibson, J. J. 1972. A theory of direct visual perception. In J. Royce, W. Rozenboom (Eds.). The Psychology of Knowing. New York: Gordon & Breach.
2. Rock, I. 1982. Inference in perception, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume 2: 525-40.
3. Marr, D. 1982. Vision (pp. 29-38). MIT Press.
4. Akins, K. 1996. Of sensory systems and the "aboutness" of mental states. Journal of Philosophy, 91: 337-72.
5. Milner, A.D. & Goodale, M.A. 1998. The functions of vision. Psyche, 4/12.
6. Noe, A. & O'Regan, J.K. 2002. On the brain basis of visual consciousness: a sensorimotor account. In A. Noe & E. Thompson (eds.) Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. Cambridge: MA: MIT Press.
J. Evolution and Innateness
1. Chomsky, N. 1987. On the nature, use and acquisition of language. In N. Chomsky, Generative Grammar, Kyoto University of Foreign Studies.
2. Pinker, S. and Bloom, P. 1990 Natural language and natural selection. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 13 (4): 707-784.
3. Bates, E., Elman, J., Johnson, M., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Parisi, D., & Plunkett, K. 1999. Innateness and emergence,. In (Bechtel & Graham, eds) Companion to Cognitive Science. Blackwell.
4. Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. 1997. Evolutionary psychology: A primer. http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html.
5. Gould, S. J. 1997. Evolution: The pleasures of pluralism. New York Review of Books, 44/11: 47-52. (second half)
6. Spelke, E. 1994. Initial knowledge: Six suggestions. Cognition, 50: 431-45.
1. Wegner, D. 2003. The minds best trick: How we experience conscious will. Trends in Cognitive Science, 7/2: 65-69.
2. Griffiths, P.E. 1990. Modularity and the psychoevolutionary theory of emotion. Biology & Philosophy 5: 175-196.
3. Hardcastle, VG. 2001. The nature of pain. In W. Bechtel, P. Mandik, J. Mundale, and R. S. Stufflebeam (Eds) Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader. Basil Blackwell.
4. Samuels, S., Stich, S. & Tremoulet, P. 1999. Rethinking rationality: From bleak implications to Darwinian modules, In E. Lepore & Pylyshyn (eds) What is Cognitive Science?, pp. 74-120 (or excerpt). Blackwell.
5. Bermudez, J.L. 1999. Precis of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. PSYCOLOQUY 10(35).
6. Farah, M.J. 2002. Emerging ethical issues in neuroscience. Nature Neuroscience 5:1123-1129.